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 Abstract 
 
This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium auction prices are pushed up 
sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a 
unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for 
all residential land auction sales in Singapore, we find that a tenderer’s bids are 
significantly higher where there was a previous land parcel sold within two years and 
located within four kilometers. The elevated price margin decreases with time and 
geographic distance.  Tracking sequential bids submitted by same developers over time, 
we find that the incumbent winner of a previous auction often participates in subsequent 
nearby land sales but does not necessarily win the sites. We argue that the incumbent 
deliberately bids up the subsequent land prices to gain pricing advantages to their own 
parcels.  
Key words: Land Sale Auctions, Strategic Sequential Bidding, Land Price, Housing 
Price, Product Differentiation    
 
JEL Codes: D43, D44, L13, R31, R38 
 1 Introduction 
 In many Asian countries, a significant portion of land is provided for private 
development through lease-based transfers from government to private ownership 
(Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel, 2015a 2015b).  In China, for example, 2.7 billion square 
meters of state-owned land were transferred for private residential and commercial 
development through leasehold sales in 2014 (China Land and Resources Statistical 
Yearbook).1  Among various ways of leasing out state-owned land, auctions have been 
widely adopted to ensure transparency of the transaction process.2  There has been an 
extensive literature on price formation of real estate auction sales, but less work has 
considered how equilibrium prices evolve in a sequence of land auctions.3  The latter is 
important because in many fast growing Asian countries, government land parcels are 
launched sequentially with high intensity to meet rising demand from economic growth.  
How land prices evolve along the sequence of auction sales becomes essential in 
understanding the dynamics of the Asian real estate market. 
 This paper studies the extent to which the equilibrium land auction price is pushed 
up sequentially due to developers’ strategic sequential bidding behaviors in a first-price 
sealed-bid auction setting.  This question is motivated by observations made on 
Singapore Government Land Sales (GLS).  In the Singapore GLS case, we observe a 
significant increase in the auction prices for land parcels launched sequentially in a close 
time frame and also within close proximity to one another. This increasing trend in prices 
seems to be caused by the incumbent winner of a previous land auction who participates 
and places a significantly higher bid for an immediate subsequent launch of land parcels 
                                                 
1
 Singapore is as another standard example where the government regularly releases land for private sector 
development through the government land sales (GLS) program.  In certain parts of Europe, such as 
Sweden and the Netherlands, central or local government also buys up land well ahead of anticipated 
development, and sells it to developers as it is required.  
2
 Chinese land sales used to be conducted through negotiations in the 1990s.  It had been heavily criticized 
for nurturing corruption and, hence, prompted a series of reforms.  In particular, a 2002 law banned 
negotiated sales by land bureaus and required all urban leasehold sales for private development to be done 
through public auctions.  Sealed bidding, as an example, has been widely adopted in Beijing and Shanghai, 
two largest cities in China. 
3
 Majority of the existing literature on real estate auctions are empirical studies. See for instance, 
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992), Lusht (1996), Quan (2002), Ching and Fu (2003), Ooi and Sirmans 
(2004), Ooi et al. (2006), Tse et al. (2011), and Chow et al. (2014), etc. Comparatively, only a small fraction 
of the theoretical literature on auctions focuses specifically on real estate (Quan, 1994; Han and Strange, 
2015). 
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within the same area.4  Moreover, although the incumbent winner of a previous land 
auction tends to bid up the price for subsequent launches, the incumbent does not 
necessarily win the auction.  This results in increased subsequent winning bids which are 
even higher than the incumbents’ (already higher) bids. 
 Previous literature has provided various explanations for rising price-sales 
sequence patterns.  For instance, prices may increase along the sales sequence if there 
exist uncertainties on the value of the goods which resolve gradually as the sequence 
evolves.  This can be in the regime of either common value auctions or private value 
auctions as previous transactions may provide additional information that is either 
publically available or private to the previous winner (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; 
McAfee and Daniel, 1993; Van den Berg et al., 2001).  From a different perspective, 
prices may also increase if previous winners prefer to monopolize the local housing 
market to extract monopolistic profit or to exploit internal economies of scale.  The third 
plausible explanation for biding high for subsequent sites is to internalize potential 
externalities associated with upcoming projects (Sirmans et al., 1997; Rauch, 1993).  
 The above hypotheses consider situations of repeated auctions or sales of the final 
consumption goods and explain the rising price-sales sequence relationship from a 
demand perspective. 5  The general implications, however, are not necessarily consistent 
with the observations that developers often participate in the subsequent land auction 
sales but often do not win the subsequent sites.6  This paper proposes and tests an 
                                                 
4
 It is so after adjusting key observed characteristics of both parcels of land. 
5
 Final consumption goods, in a standard auction setting, are associated with either independent private 
values or common values unknown to bidders ex ante.  The value of these goods directly adds to a buyer’s 
payoff upon procurement.  The procurement of land, however, is used as intermediate inputs in a bidder’s 
profit maximization decision at a later stage.  In this sense, the auction outcomes at the initial stage 
generate externalities that influence future interactions among bidders. There is a literature on simultaneous 
auctions with externalities that considered various situations where the change of ownership by auction 
sales affects the nature of subsequent interaction in the respective markets.  Examples include changes in 
ownership in oligopolies through takeover and merger, the licensing of innovations to downstream 
competing producers, the deteriorated reputation that impacts subsequent winning probability, purchase of 
intermediate input from a manufacture, etc (Gilbert and newbery, 1982; Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Hart et al., 1990; Kamien, 1992; Segal, 1999; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000).  
Researchers in this field often assume that bidders have private information about incurred externalities and 
focus on the efficiency and revenue-maximizing procedures of implementing simultaneous auctions. So far 
to our knowledge, no studies have investigated auctions that involve the sequential sale of an intermediate 
good and specifically modeled the subsequent competition between final substitutable products.  There is 
neither empirical work that rigorously verifies various implications of similar types of model.  
6
 If there is true benefit associated with winning the subsequently launched sites and that is not particular to 
the previous winner as in the case of common value auctions, we would imagine that the incumbent winner 
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alternative hypothesis which explains the rising price-sales sequence relationship from 
the perspective of competition strategies adopted by auction bidders.  To uncover the 
potential pricing competition from the supply perspective, we focus on sequential auction 
sales of land as an intermediate good.  We show that the strategic bidding behavior not 
only generates the rising price pattern but also predicts that developers often participate 
but do not necessarily win the subsequently launched sites.  
 We test the hypothesis using a unique dataset published by the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) in Singapore.  The dataset contains the universe of the 
tendering prices submitted by all land developers for all private residential land sales 
through the GLS program.  The nature of the data allows us to track each individual 
developer’s bidding behavior over time, regardless of whether they win the site or not.  
By geographically linking a land plot to its sequentially launched neighboring plots, we 
compare bids placed by the same developer along a sequence of highly substitutable land 
parcel auctions.  This allows us to test and confirm the rising price-sales sequence pattern 
after controlling for parcel specific characteristics and time and developer fixed effects.  
By tracking developers’ bidding behaviors along the sequence, we also test the incumbent 
winner’s tendency to participate and to win the subsequent land auctions.    
 A potential endogeneity concern in addressing the incumbent’s tendency to 
participate and win a subsequent site resides in two major unobserved differences 
between the winners and other losing bidders. The first difference is their unobserved 
taste for sites in the same area. The incumbent wins maybe because the incumbent sees 
higher development potential in the area and hence is more likely to bid again for sites in 
the same area.  We address this issue by comparing the previous winner and the second 
highest bidder with similar bids.  This idea has been explored in Greenstone et al. (2010) 
in identifying agglomeration spillovers by comparing the winner and the secondly ranked 
loser of large plant openings.  
                                                                                                                                                 
would not have a stronger incentive to participate in subsequent launches (after controlling for capacity 
constraints) compared to other bidders.  If however benefits of obtaining subsequent sites accrue mainly to 
the winner of a previous site out of monopoly or externality reasons, the incumbent should incur a higher 
reserve price and hence will be more likely to win the subsequent sites (after controlling for capacity 
constraints). Hence the discrepancy in participating and winning the following sites (after controlling for 
potential capacity constraints) seem to be inconsistent with the hypotheses on uncertainties, monopoly, or 
externalities.  
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  The second set of factors explaining the tendency to participate and win a follow-
up site is potential capacity constraints and financial constraints which are directly 
affected by winning or losing a prior site.  We address the concern on capacity constraint 
by directly controlling for developer fixed effects and the accumulated gross floor area 
that the developer has engaged in developing in the previous two years at the time of 
bidding for a new site.  We address the concern on financial constraint by comparing the 
rate of participating in and winning the subsequently launched parcels that are close in 
distance (serve as direct substitutes to the winning site) and those that are further away 
(do not compete directly with the winning site).  The identification assumption is that the 
impact of financing constraints on the tendency to bid for subsequent sites is the same for 
sites at various distances and, hence, will be differenced out.  The remaining comparison 
of the difference between the treatment group and the control group identifies the 
incumbents’ tendency to participate or win subsequent nearby parcel launches out of the 
strategic bidding motive.   
 We obtain the following findings. We show that tenderers’ bids are significantly 
higher when there was a previous land parcel sold within 2 years and located within 4 km 
in distance.  We also find that the increased price margin decreases as the distance 
becomes larger or as the time gap between auctions gets longer.  In other words, 
developers tend to bid higher for parcels that are more likely to be substitutable to an 
existing earlier parcel.  Finally, we find that the incumbent winner is more likely to 
participate in the subsequent nearby land auction but does not necessarily win the 
auction.  Our analysis shows that given the competitive environment in Singapore, land 
prices are mechanically driven up over time due to the strategic behavior of bidders. In 
times of rising property prices, this suggests possibilities of supply side cooling measures 
such as not launching parcels within close time and proximity. 
 These findings make three key contributions to the literature. First, we document 
how the equilibrium price is affected by strategic sequential bidding behaviors in a first-
price sealed-bid auction setting.  Previous literature has focused on comparing prices 
formed with different auction types as well as with other methods of sale (Ashenfelter 
and Genesove, 1992; Lusht, 1996; Quan 2002; and Chow and Ooi, 2013). This paper 
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proposes an important sequential bidding factor that needs to be taken into consideration 
while comparing different auction outcomes or with other methods of sale.  
 Second, our findings are related to the literature on rising or declining price 
anomaly.  The law of one price implies no persistent price pattern for identical assets sold 
sequentially (Weber, 1983).  However, there is evidence of price-sales sequence 
anomalies that deviate from the expected result (Ashenfelter, 1989; Ashenfelter and 
Genesove, 1992; Black and de Meza, 1992; Rauch, 1993; McAfee and Daniel, 1993; 
Beggs and Graddy, 1997; Sirmans et al., 1997; Deltas and Kosmpolou, 2004; Burguet, 
2005; Raviv, 2006; Mezzeti, 2011).  Previous studies have proposed various rationales 
from the demand side to account for the observed rising or declining price-sales sequence 
relationship (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; McAfee and Daniel, 1993; Van den Berg et al., 
2001; Mezzeti, 2011).  This paper provides a supply side perspective on price-sales 
sequence anomalies by focusing on the competition of final developed properties.   
 Finally, we also contribute to the literature on contracting with externalities.  
Previous studies have considered various scenarios in which contracting situations 
involve multilateral externalities.  Hart et al., (1990) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) 
specifically considers the situation in which a downstream firm purchasing an 
intermediate input from a manufacturer which imposes a negative externality on 
competing firms.  Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) further take into consideration 
downstream externalities in an auction setting.  This paper considers a specific case of 
sequential multi-object auctions which generate externalities and affect downstream 
interactions among bidders.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the background 
of Singapore GLS and a specific example that illustrates the strategies adopted by land 
developers while participating in the GLS auctions.  Section 3 discusses existing theories 
and also proposes an alternative hypothesis on sequential bidding strategies.  Section 4 
discusses the data and the identification strategy.  Section 5 presents empirical findings.  
Section 6 concludes.  
2 Background and Case Study 
 The Singapore Government owns more than seventy-five percent of the land 
nationwide.  It releases land regularly through the GLS program for private sector 
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development.  The release of land is intended to meet rising demand from economic 
growth and also to stabilize prices in the housing market.  The GLS is managed by three 
land sales agents: Housing Development Board (HDB), URA, and JTC Corporation 
(JTC).  HDB usually sells land located within public housing estates.  URA covers land 
sales for commercial, hotel, private residential and industrial developments island wide.  
JTC manages mainly industrial land sales.  In this study, we focus only on private 
residential development lands sold by URA from 1990 to 2014.   
 The GLS program is planned and announced every six months.  Land parcels on 
the confirmed list are sold at pre-determined dates through first-price sealed-bid auctions.  
The process is as follows.  When a development site is released for sale, interested 
bidders are invited to purchase a Developer’s Packet containing the planning and design 
guidelines for the site.  The residential sites, which are the focus of this paper, usually 
entail a leasehold tenure of 99 years.7  Interested bidders are then required to prepare the 
tender submission before the closing date of the auction.  The bids are opened and the 
names of all bidders and their respective bids are posted on the same day.  The site is then 
awarded to the highest bid exceeding the reserve price.8  Sealed-bid is the preferred 
method of sale in Singapore (instead of an open auction) because it is believed to reduce 
the probability of collusion among potential bidders.9 
 Once the highest bidder has been awarded the site, the government agency 
monitors the development progress closely in order to ensure that the outcome is in 
accordance with the planning and technical requirements stipulated in the auction 
submission.  The successful bidder is also prohibited from selling the leasehold to outside 
parties.  In addition, the bidder must complete the development within the specified time 
frame in order to avoid punitive fines for late completion. This ensures that there is no 
strategic land banking used to hedge against housing price volatilities. 
                                                 
7
 There is only one residential site in our data that has 60-year leasehold tenure. This short-term lease site is 
zoned for residential development and can be developed into a condominium or flat. 
8
 The reserve price, which is not revealed to bidders, is set equal to 85% of the Chief Valuer’s assessed 
market value for the development site.  The valuation, which is submitted by the Chief Valuer in a sealed 
envelope before the tender closing date, is opened at the same time as the received bids. 
9
 Also in Asia, Chinese land sales used to be done by negotiation, which was notorious for corruption. For 
that reason, a 2002 law banned negotiated sales by land bureaus and introduced public auctions for 
leasehold land sales.  In Hong Kong, the method of sale for the government sites is open auction, which is 
more susceptible to collusion among bidders (Ching and Fu, 2003). 
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 The final completed projects of private residential condominiums compete with 
each other in pricing as well as in their amenities and location advantages.  Location is 
generally considered as a very influential factor among potential condominium buyers 
given significant variation in access to workplace, schools, parks, and 
commercial/shopping centers.  Within the same area though, newly completed 
condominium projects compete with each other in pricing especially at the initial presale 
stage (before project completion).  This implies that condominiums that are in close 
proximity and are launched around the same period are highly substitutable.10  Hence 
developers often choose to bid strategically in the auction stage taking into consideration 
likely competition with projects completed around the same time in the same area.   
 One pattern arising from the data is that the incumbent winner (of land from a 
previous auction) often places a higher bid on subsequent launch of land parcels in the 
same area.  We consider this as evidence consistent with a sequential bidding strategy 
adopted by developers, which eventually leads to rising land prices along the sequence of 
the auction sales. We illustrate the sequential bidding strategy adopted by land developers 
with a real-life case study discussed as follows.   
 In January 2011, the Singapore Government launched a land parcel along Bedok 
Reservoir Road in Bedok Urban Planning Area.  The exact location of this plot is shown 
in Figure 1 and marked as Site 1.  This plot of land attracted eight bids submitted either 
solely or jointly by different land developers before it closed in March 2011.  Details of 
the bidding information are presented in Table 1.  The highest tenderer bid for this site 
was placed by UVD (United Venture Development Pte. Ltd.) with SGD 5,010 per Gross 
Floor Area (GFA).  The second highest bid was SGD 4,885 per GFA and was submitted 
jointly by FE Lakeside Pte. Ltd., FCL Topaz Pte. Ltd., and Sekisui House Singapore Pte. 
Ltd. (referred to as FE-FCL-Sekisui in the following context).   
 Following site 1 and in the same Bedok Urban Planning Area, the Government 
launched another land parcel along Bedok South Avenue 3 in December 2011.  This plot 
of land is also shown on Figure 1 and marked as Site 2.  The distance between these two 
                                                 
10
 Condominiums in Singapore take up about 10% of the overall housing market share and are designed as 
luxury living quarters to cater high-income home buyers. As shown in Baltagi and Li (2015), they all 
contain fully furnished units and share similar designs and similar luxurious outdoor amenities.  In the 
Singapore context, condominiums that are launched close in time and also close in proximity are highly 
substitutable.  
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sites is roughly 3,200 meters.  This time round, the site attracted seven bids from the 
market.  Both the winner and the second highest bidder of Site 1 participated in the 
bidding for Site 2.  Both parties have increased their tendering prices significantly.  As 
shown in Table 1, the winner of Site 1 (UVD) increased its tendering price by 13%, after 
adjusting for GFA.  This price ranked UVD the second highest in this new round of 
bidding for Site 2.  The bidding price jointly submitted by FE-FCL-Sekisui increased by 
18% compared to their previous bid for Site 1, which enables them to win this new plot 
of land.   
 The next land parcel launched in Bedok Planning Area was along Tanah Merah 
Kechil Road, which is about 1,000 meters away from Site 2 as shown on Figure 1.  This 
land parcel was launched in June 2012 and closed in July 2012.  Before its closing date, 
this site received thirteen bids altogether.  Both UVD and FE-FCL-Sekisui, again, joined 
the bidding for Site 3.  In the end, neither of these developers won this new site although 
both UVD and FE-FCL-Sekisui have increased their tendering prices by 18% and 4% 
respectively compared to their previous bids for Site 2.  The winning bid was SGD 7,277 
per GFA and was jointly submitted by Fragrance Group Ltd. and World Class Land Pte. 
Ltd.. 
 There are two patterns arising from this example.  First, we observe that bidding 
prices have increased substantially during this 18-month period.  Specifically, the GFA 
adjusted tendering prices have increased overall by 33.57% and 22.74% for UVD and 
FE-FCL-Sekisui respectively.  In fact, each subsequent parcel launch is associated with a 
notable jump in tendering prices, which accumulates to a significant overall increase in 
local land auction prices.  Second, the incumbent winner of a previous land parcel tends 
to participate in subsequent launches of new sites in the same area but does not 
necessarily win the new sites. For example, UVD continued to participate GLS auctions 
for Site 2 and Site 3 after successfully winning Site 1.  However, in both subsequent 
auctions, UVD did not win the sites even though UVD has substantially raised its 
tendering prices.   
 There are several possible explanations for the increase in bids for each nearby 
subsequent parcel launch that we observe in this case study.  One may argue that the price 
run-ups along the sequence of the sale is due to better underneath topological features or 
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better amenities in the close surrounding area of each subsequently launched parcel.  In 
the following empirical analysis, we control for parcel specific characteristics and 
location fixed effects to address this issue.  Alternatively one may argue that it is the 
rising housing prices and construction costs that drive up the bidding prices overtime.  
This is, however, unlikely to be the cause given that the housing price index for private 
condominiums in Singapore merely increased by 2.5 % from March 2011 to July 2012 
and the construction costs have been quite stable over the same period of time.  In fact, as 
we document at the empirical section that after controlling for various observed 
characteristics of each land parcel and time-varying housing prices and construction 
costs, we still find significant evidence for price run-ups associated with sequential sale 
and land parcels in the same area.   
 Aside from potential omitted variables, previous literature has provided 
explanations for price run-ups along the sale sequence of highly substitutable goods.  We 
explain different theories in the following section that likely explain part of what we have 
observed in the data.  We also propose our own hypothesis which, we believe, is most in 
line with the anecdotal evidence as well as with our empirical findings. 
3 Theory 
 There are various explanations for price run-ups along the sales sequence of 
highly substitutable goods.  First of all, prices may increase for auctions taking place at 
the later stage of the sales sequence if there exist uncertainties on the value of the 
auctioned goods.  In the framework of common value auctions, early sales may provide 
additional information for subsequent sales which reduces concerns about the winner’s 
curse in subsequent auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; McAfee and Daniel, 1993; Van 
den Berg et al., 2001).  In the regime of private value auctions, winners of the previous 
auction may derive private information from owning the land and hence may capitalize 
the private information into higher bidding prices for subsequent auctions.  For land 
auctions in particular, the intrinsic value of the land could be better revealed to late 
buyers as previous sales are used to validate perceived common asset values or to the 
winner of a previous auction as more private information was obtained from the previous 
win.   
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 The second set of explanatory factors for subsequent higher bids is potential 
benefits associated with being a monopoly.  The winner of a previous land auction may 
want to monopolize the local housing market to acquire monopolistic profit.  It is also 
likely that developing two neighboring parcels together will allow the winner to better 
explore internal economies of scale which increases productivity and reduces costs.  Both 
factors will lead to higher bidding prices for subsequently launched parcels.  
 The third plausible explanation for rising price-sales sequence relationship is the 
declining externality effect as new residential developments are being built out (Sirmans 
et al., 1997).  The idea is that the early consumers or developers tend to face higher 
uncertain neighborhood externalities.  As the sales sequence evolves, potential 
consumption risk may reduce which leads to higher willingness to pay for the subsequent 
sales. Moreover as more and more sites are being developed in the same area, 
agglomeration economies in the form of external economies of scale may serve as 
another plausible factor contributing to higher land prices over time (Ranch, 1993).  
 The above hypotheses hinge greatly on the rationale that a subsequently launched 
land parcel is associated with higher real benefits which accrue to higher reserve price 
upon bidding for a subsequent parcel.  These arguments help to explain rising price-sales 
sequence relationship from a demand perspective.  However, they seem to be inconsistent 
with the observation that developers often participate in the subsequent land auction sales 
but at the same time, do not necessarily win the subsequent site.  To reconcile the 
discrepancy in participating and winning the subsequent site, we argue that the incumbent 
winner of the previous auction participates in the subsequent parcel launch in order to 
push up potential rival’s land cost and gain pricing advantages for its own parcel at the 
sales stage.  
 We present a simple model to explain the underlying mechanism.  Suppose that 
firm 1 and firm 2 are two identical land-developing companies competing for two 
identical land parcels launched sequentially (assume that the sale of the second parcel 
was announced after the auction of the first parcel). We also assume that firm 1 is the 
incumbent firm who has won a prior bid at . After that, firm 1 and 2 simultaneously bid 
11 
 
for the second land parcel (the winning bid is denoted by ). 11  If firm 1 loses the second 
bid, both firms compete in a differentiated price duopoly.  Assume that their respective 
profits are as shown in Figure 2 (the red line and the blue line and labeled as  and ). 
We note that in this case, 
	
> 0 and  	
	
< 0. 12  If firm 1 wins the second bid, it will 
act as a monopoly in choosing prices for both developments. We assume that the 
monopolistic profit is as shown in Figure 2 as the green line (labeled as Π).  Since firm 1 
owns both land parcels in this case, we have 
	
< 0.We assume that Π will intersect  
due to potential capacity constraints or high financing costs associated with developing 
two parcels simultaneously.  Intuitively, this implies that monopoly will incur lower 
profit when the cost of obtaining the second land parcel becomes too high to justify the 
cost for monopolizing the market. The intersection of the blue and the red line is  since 
 =  when  =  due to symmetry of identical firms.  The intersection of the green 
and red line is denoted by ∗.  
 The incumbent firm 1 will try to maximize profits by comparing  and Π that 
correspond to different winning bid  associated with the second land parcel.  If firm 2 
places a bid below ∗ (the intersection of  and Π), the incumbent would be better off 
forming a monopoly since Π > . In this case, firm 1 would bid slightly higher than 
firm 2’s bidding price to win the auction.  Firm 2, given positive profits, also has 
incentive to outbid firm 1, which eventually causes the winning bid for the second land 
parcel, , to infinitely approach ∗. If firm 2 places a bid above ∗, the incumbent firm 
would prefer to lose the auction by bidding slightly lower than firm 2’s bid (since Π <
). Given positive profits, firm 2 would still want to outbid firm 1 to win the second 
parcel.  Knowing firm 2’s desire to win, the incumbent would want to push up the value 
                                                 
11
 Both  and  can be endogenously solved for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. However, this 
paper will not solve the whole model but instead we focus on how profit maximization in the second stage 
leads to differences in  and  in the auction stage.  
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
	
> 0 because, as noted by Salop and Scheffman (1983), high-cost rival may reduce output, allowing 
the predator to raise price or market share. This is true especially if firms are financially constrained with 
their investments. With a large amount of investment to obtain patent, for example, financially constrained 
investors end up having less resources at disposal to expand business. In the context of land sales, 
financially constrained rivals, once have spent a significant amount to obtain the land parcel, may end up 
cutting output which increases the predator’s profit.  
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of  and maximize firm 2’s winning bids.  The largest firm 2 could possibly bid is given 
by  at which firm 2 makes zero profits.   
 If we impose a tie-breaking rule which gives firm 2 priorities if having equal bids, 
then we can find a set of Nash Equilibriums.  We can show that any equal bids between 
∗ and  would form a Nash Equilibrium which implies that the realized winning bid 
 is greater than c.  The reason is as follows.  Since Π <  when  ≥ ∗, letting firm 
2 win the bid is optimal for firm 1 when  ≥ ∗. In this scenario, firm 1’s best response 
to firm 2’s bid is any bid which is below or equal to firm 2’s bid if firm 2’s bid is above or 
equal to ∗.  Firm 1 strictly prefers not to win the bid but its participation is required to 
keep the bid price high.  In the meanwhile, firm 2 has a dominant strategy to win the 
auction as long as the winning bid  yields positive profits for firm 2.  To achieve the 
highest profit given firm 1’s bid, firm 2 would place a bid equal to firm 1’s bid and would 
not have incentive to deviate from it.  Therefore, the pair of bids, (c, ), becomes Nash 
Equilibrium, which imposes that the winning bid of the second land parcel, c, is greater 
than c. 
4 Empirics 
4.1 Data and Variables 
 This paper empirically tests the proposed hypothesis using a unique dataset in 
Singapore.  The primary dataset is a GLS core file that is compiled from three different 
government sources: URA, HDB, and JTC.  The complied GLS dataset contains all 
tendering prices submitted by land developers for all parcels that have been launched in 
Singapore ever since 1990.  For the purpose of this study, we restrict the GLS to only 
those designated for the development of private residential condominiums (mainly sites 
sold by URA).  This ensures sufficient substitutability between successively launched 
parcels when developers consider potential price competition between final developed 
projects.  Altogether, we have 248 parcels launched through the GLS program between 
1990 and 2014 and that were developed into private condominiums in our dataset.   
 Summary statistics of land parcel characteristics are presented in Table 2a.  The 
mean of the gross floor area across all parcels is 45,790 square meters.  On average, each 
parcel auction attracts 6.7 bidders.  The average winning bid is 161 million Singapore 
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dollars.  Among all condominium projects, one project is associated with 60-year tenure 
status with the rest being standard 99-year leasehold projects.13  Parcel launches vary 
with time in response to the general housing cycles in Singapore.  The number of condo 
parcels launched in each year is reported in Table 2b.  When the housing market was  
booming, such as the years prior to the 1998 Asian financial crisis, the number of new 
parcels launched within a year was as high as 38.  During market downturns, such as in 
1998 and 1999, no residential condominium land parcels have been launched due to 
subdued demand.   
 Among various characteristics of each land parcel, we are particularly concerned 
with locational advantages in accessing the CBD area and the closest MRT station.  This 
is because the CBD area and areas close to the existing MRT stations tend to be 
developed earlier in the sequence and are often associated with higher prices.  This will 
imply a downward price-sequence relationship that goes to the opposite direction to our 
proposed increasing price sequence pattern.  To capture the extent of the downward bias, 
we explicitly control for each land parcel’s distance to the CBD and its distance to the 
closest MRT stations.  We do so by pinpointing each land parcel’s geographic location 
and linking the site to its nearby amenities.  Specifically, relying on GIS software 
(MapInfo and MapBasic), we measure the distance of a particular private residential land 
parcel to the Singapore CBD area (as captured by the location of the Raffles Place MRT 
station) and to the nearby closest MRT station.  As reported also in Table 2a, the average 
distance to Singapore downtown area is 9,511 meters.  The average distance to the closest 
MRT station is 960 meters.   
 The GIS technique is also crucial for us to link a parcel to its nearby parcels so as 
to capture whether two subsequent launches are within close distance.  We do so by first 
creating pairs of existing land parcels.  Having pinpointed the latitude and longitude 
associated with each site, we use the GIS software to calculate pair-wise distances in 
kilometers.  Based on the closing date of each auction sale, we also calculate the time lag 
between two parcel sales within each pair.  This allows us to identify those parcels that 
had a previous launch taken place within 4 km and within the last 2 years.  According to 
the hypothesis proposed earlier, those parcel prices tend to be bid up by the incumbent 
                                                 
13
 The one site that is associated with 60-year tenure status is located at Jalan Jurong Kechil.   
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winners of previous parcel sales in the same area.  Hence, we create dummies that 
identify these land parcels with higher extent of substitutability to the earlier sites to 
capture any price margin associated with them.  We have also experimented with setting 
3.5 km and 4.5 km circles in geographic distance as well as time lag categorized as within 
half a year, between half a year and one year, and between one year and two years. These 
different categories capture the different extent of parcel substitutability and allow us to 
examine the impact of the extent of production differentiation on the exact magnitude of 
the elevated price margin.  
 We invested substantial amount of efforts to identify the unique bidder 
participating in government land auction sales repeatedly.  This is because in the original 
dataset, we have only the name of the bidders identified.  These bidders identified by 
unique names, however, do not always correspond to the ultimate decision making 
entities that manage auction bids.  Many property developers in Singapore have a number 
of subsidiary companies with each separately identified by a unique name in the data.  
The profit maximizing decision is however made at the parent company level, taking into 
consideration of production taking place at all subsidiary companies.  To capture the 
sequential bidding behavior exhibited by the same parent company, we manually link 
each bidder reported in the data to its corresponding parent company.  Eventually, 567 
unique bidders reported in the data are matched to 335 unique parent companies. The 
linkage substantially reduced the number of participating entities in sequential land 
auctions.  As summarized in Figure 3, within all parent companies identified, 167 
companies bid only once, which are often the case of private individuals bidding for 
small land parcel sales.  More importantly, there are a few large developers that have 
been participating government land parcel sales repeatedly.  The sequential bidding 
behaviors of these repeated participants are the focus of this paper.   
 Table 2c presents the summary statistics at the tenderer level. Aside from the 
standard controls that vary by parcels, we have also included tenderer specific 
characteristics upon bidding for a particular site.  These include whether the developer 
submits the bidding price jointly with other developers (joint bid), the tenderer’s 
accumulated experience (captured by the accumulated gross floor area of previous 
winning sites), and the tenderer’s likelihood of being capacity constrained (captured by 
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the accumulated gross floor area of the previous 2 years of winning sites).  As shown in 
the table, 40% of the bids are submitted jointly by more than one land developers.  The 
average accumulated land development area among all bidders upon bidding for a new 
site is roughly 128,000 square meters, ranging from no prior experience at all to 
807,518.8 square meters.  The average accumulated land development area in the 
previous 2 years is about 53,000 square meters. 
4.2  Identification 
 There are two goals to achieve in the empirical exercise.  The first goal is to 
identify the price premium associated with subsequently launched land parcels that are 
highly substitutable to the prior sites.  To do so, we estimate a standard hedonic 
regression with a set of dummies capturing the extent of product substitutability between 
two successively launched parcels.   The specification is as follows: 
 
 = !" + !$ + %& + ' + ( + ) (3.1) 
 In the above specification, * represents a tenderer, + stands for a land parcel, and , 
indexes the quarter in which the parcel auction closes.  Initially, $ is a dummy variable 
capturing whether subsequently launched parcels are highly substitutable to the prior site.  
The extent of substitution of a site is captured by whether it is associated with a previous 
site launched within 4 km and also within 2 years.  Later on, $ is broken into three 
categorical dummies to capture the different extent of substitution/production 
differentiation: whether the previous launch within the same distance took place within 
half a year, between half a year and one year, and between one year and two years.  We 
expect to observe declining increased price margins as the two parcels become less 
substitutable given that they are less likely to directly compete with each other in pricing.   
 The second goal of the empirics is to explore the mechanism that may give rise to 
the price increase associated with subsequently launched sites in the same area.  We argue 
that prices are bid up by incumbent winners to gain pricing advantages of final developed 
properties.  This implies that the incumbent winner of the previous site will be more 
inclined to participate in auctions for subsequently launched parcels that may become 
substitutable to their winning site and that will directly compete with their sites in pricing 
at the sales stage.  However participation itself does not necessarily lead to winning the 
16 
 
site due to capacity or financing constraints often associated with managing multiple 
parcels within a short time frame.   
 We empirically test these implications by examining the probability of 
participating/winning subsequent parcel auction sales by the incumbent winner of a 
previous site as compared to other losing bidders of the same site.  To do so, we first 
create pairs of a prior site and a follow-up site for sites that are launched less than two 
years apart of each other. This paring strategy will allow us to explore whether the winner 
of a prior site has a higher probability to participate in and win the follow-up site. Do 
note that one prior site can be matched to several follow-up sites launched within the next 
two years.  This leads to an expansion of the sample size.  
One source of endogeneity in identifying the tendency to participate in and win 
the following site is that the winners vary significantly from other auction participants in 
their unobserved taste for subsequent sites in the same area.  For instance, an incumbent 
winner of a site may see greater development potential for the area compared to other 
bidders and hence are more likely to participate/win subsequent parcel sales in the same 
area.  This will lead to an overestimation of the tendency of incumbent winners to 
participate/win subsequent nearby parcel launches with the purpose of gaining pricing 
advantages.  We address this endogeneity issue by restricting the comparison to between 
the previous winner and the second highest bidder with a bid difference less than 5% of 
the winning bid.  This ensures that the treated group (previous winners) share similar 
unobserved characteristics to the control group (second highest bidders with almost same 
bids), as reflected by their willingness to pay for the same prior site.   
 The tendency to participate/win subsequent parcel auctions is also subject to the 
difference in capacity/financing constraint between previous winners and losers.  The 
incumbent winner is likely to be capacity constrained or financially constrained.  This 
causes the incumbent winner to be less likely to bid for and hence, win subsequent site 
launches, which leads to an underestimation of the tendency to participate/win.  To this 
end, we directly controlling for developer fixed effects and capacity constraint. We also 
address the issue with financial constraint by further comparing participation/winning 
rate for subsequently launched parcels that are close in distance (serve as direct 
substitutes to the winning site) and those that are further apart (do not compete directly).   
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 This identification lends itself naturally to a difference-in-differences strategy.  
The identification assumption is that the impact of financial constraint on the tendency to 
bid for subsequent sites is the same for sites at various distances and, hence, will be 
differenced out.  The remaining comparison of the difference between the treated group 
and the control group identifies the impact of winning a site on the tendency to 
participate subsequent nearby parcel launches with the purpose of gaining pricing 
advantages for final developed properties.  The corresponding specification is shown 
below, 
 
-.-,**/.,012 = !" + !312 + !$12 + !4312 × $12 + !6712 + ' + 81 + 92 + )12 (3.2) 
 
-:*;12 = !" + !312 + !$12 + !4312 × $12 + !6712 + ' + 81 + 92 + )12 (3.3) 
where, / stands for the previous site, < stands for the subsequently launched sites within 
the next 2 years, * indexes the tenderer,  3 is a dummy variable indicating the treated 
group (incumbent winner of a previous site), $ identifies subsequent sites that are within 
4 km.  C controls for the tenderer’s capacity constraint at the time of bidding. The 
coefficient of the interaction term identifies the tendency for incumbent winner to 
participate/win subsequently launched sites to gain pricing advantages.  
5  Results 
 To explain tenderer’s bids placed on each government land auction sales, we first 
estimate a standard hedonic regression with log tenderer prices as the dependent variable.  
Results are reported in Table 3.  We experimented with various specifications including 
time fixed effects, tenderer fixed effects, or both time fixed effects and tenderer fixed 
effects.  The estimated coefficients vary slightly in magnitude.  The estimated shadow 
prices associated with various hedonic characteristics are consistent with intuition.  First, 
the tenderer bids increase with the gross floor area.  1 percent increase in gross floor area 
is associated with 0.8 percent increase in tenderer bids.  60-year tenure status is 
associated with significantly lower tendering bids when compared to those with the 
standard 99-year lease.  Besides, the distance to Downtown and the distance to the closest 
MRT stations are both negatively correlated with tenderer’s bids, with the estimated 
elasticity 0.34 and 0.06 respectively.  Moreover, the number of bids is included in the 
regression to capture how popular a land sale is or the intensity of the competition.  We 
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see that a higher number of bids is associated with higher bidding prices.  Finally, when 
developers submit bids jointly, they tend to bid higher as they are, in this instance, less 
likely to be capacity constrained.  With more bidding experiences accumulated, 
developers bid higher.  If developers are more likely to be capacity constrained, as 
captured by the accumulated areas in the previous two years, bidding prices will be lower.  
 We next explore the extent to which prices have been pushed up along the sales 
sequence and the extent to which the increased price margin is affected by the extent of 
substitutability.  The latter is captured by varying two aspects of two successively 
launched land parcels: the time distance and the geographic distance.  We first identify 
parcels that have a prior launch taken place within 4 km and within the previous 2 years.  
As reported in Table 4 Columns 1-3, these parcels receive tenderer bids that are roughly 
80% higher compared to other parcels.  When the time distance is further decomposed 
into three categories: previous half a year, between half a year and 1 year, and between 1 
year and 2 years, we observe a declining increased price margin alone the time distance 
(Table 4, Columns 4-6).  When two sequential nearby launches take place within half a 
year, the subsequent parcel receives the highest increased price margin, 61% as compared 
to other parcels that are either beyond the 4 km distance or launched more than 2 years 
ago.  The price margin reduces to 40% when the time distance is between half a year and 
1 year.  For parcels had previous launches within 4 km but time wise between 1 year and 
2 years, the price margin is not significantly different from the omitted category.  
 Evidence suggests that the subsequent tendering prices have been pushed up 
mainly for sites that are launched within the next one year.  This could be because closely 
launched sites are more likely to appeal to the same group of homebuyers and, hence, 
will directly compete with each other.  The directly competition is also partly explained 
by the likelihood that the previous project has not completely sold out all the units at the 
presale stage which creates incentives for previous winner to defend its price.   
 As further robustness checks, we also experimented with varying the geographic 
distance between two parcels.   Instead of using 4 km as the threshold, we have also 
experimented with 3.5 km and 5 km as reported in Table A1 and Table A2.  The results on 
the declining increased price margins along the time distance hold in all cases with the 
exact magnitude varying within an understandable range.  To incorporate various 
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situations in a more visual setting, we have shown in Figure 4 the estimated coefficients 
associated with various time distances and spatial thresholds.  Table A3 reports another 
scenario in which we vary the geographic distance while holding the time lag being 
constant at 2 years.  We also observe that the increased price margin declines with 
geographic distance.  For example, parcels with previous launch taken place with 2 years 
and within 4 km is associated with 13% higher tenderer bids compared to those either 
beyond 2 years or beyond 12 km.  The magnitude reduces to 11.0% when a parcel had a 
previous launch within 2 years and within 8 km.  The results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that the elevated price margin declines with the extent of product 
differentiation. 
 Another concern on the baseline specification is the possibility of other 
unobserved location amenities that may also influence the key estimated coefficients.  To 
address this concern and also for further robustness checks, we have included urban 
planning area fixed effects and planning area by year fixed effects in our estimation. 
Results are reported in Table 5.  The estimated coefficients on the previously included 
distance to CBD and distance to the closest MRT stations become insignificant as 
expected.  The estimated price increase associated with subsequently launched land 
parcels is still positive and significant, even though the magnitude reduces to 50%.  The 
evidence on declining increased price margin as two successive parcels become less 
substitutable in time dimension remains consistent.     
 We now assess the impact of the competitive bidding behaviors from a different 
perspective – consider sites that are launched in isolation.  The idea is that if sites were 
launched in isolation, land developers would not have incentive to push the price up and 
the associated tenderer bids would be much lower.  We capture isolated sites using a 
dummy variable that identifies parcels with NO previous nearby launch within 2 years 
and NO subsequent nearby launch within 2 years.  As shown in Table 6, isolated sites are 
associated with 70% decrease in tenderer prices, which is also consistent with our 
hypothesis. 
 Next we report results on the incumbent’s tendency to participate and win 
subsequently launched sites.  Table 7 columns 1-3 focus on the decision to participate.  
Columns 4-6 are on the probability of winning subsequent sites.  The estimated 
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coefficients associated with the interaction term are significantly positive for the decision 
to participate.  The magnitude ranges from 0.0467 to 0.1027.  These are fairly large effect 
given the fact that the majority of the bidders are small developers or individuals who 
tend not to engage in repeated competition with other large developers.  In fact, the mean 
probability of consecutive participation is 22%.  We show that compared to the second 
highest bidder, the incumbent is at least 21% (5.26/22) more likely to participate in 
subsequent nearby parcel launches.  This suggests that the incumbent has a strong 
incentive to participate in the immediate subsequent land auction if the site is closer in 
distance to the previous winning site.  The tendency to win the next nearby site is, 
however, insignificant.  Estimated coefficients on the relative tendency to win subsequent 
sites (columns 4-6) are negative and insignificant.  These findings are consistent with the 
proposed mechanism that the incumbent winner of the previous site tends to participate in 
the subsequent launch to push up the equilibrium bidding price.  However, due to various 
considerations, they do not necessarily win the subsequent sites.    
 As a falsification test, in a different exercise we treat the second highest bidder of 
a previous site as a pseudo incumbent winner.  We compare the pseudo incumbent 
winner’s tendency to bid for and win the subsequent site to that of the third highest bidder 
of the same site with very similar bids. Results are shown in Table 8.  As expected, the 
previously identified incentive to participate in subsequent nearby land auctions is no 
longer present for the pseudo incumbent.  The tendency to win the subsequent nearby site 
is still insignificant. 
6 Conclusion 
 Motivated by Government Land Sales in Singapore where several large 
developers interact in land auctions repeatedly, we set out to find if there are any strategic 
implications of the secondary developed property market on the primary land market 
auction outcomes.  Our simply model suggests that the incumbent winner of the previous 
land auction prefers the cost of the second land parcel be high so as to gain pricing 
advantages for its own parcel at a later sales stage.  To ensure this happens, the incumbent 
often participates in the subsequent land sales and places significantly higher bids to push 
up the price. At the same time, the incumbent does not necessarily win the sites due to 
potential capacity constraints or financing constraints.  
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 Using government land sales data from Singapore, we find supporting evidence 
for our hypotheses.  Specifically we show that tendering prices are significantly higher 
when there was a previous launch taken place in the past two years and also within 4 km 
distance.  At the same time, in the incumbent winner of a previous land auction is more 
likely to participate in subsequent nearby land sales but does not necessarily win the new 
sites.  This seems to suggest that the strategic bidding behavior causes winning bids for 
GLS to go up and consequentially may lead to higher prices in the developed property 
market. In this case, potential supply-side cooling measures that target at this behavior 
may be effective in reducing property prices. For example, the government may limit 
incumbent firms from participating in certain auctions or choose not to release lands that 
are close together in a sequential fashion.  Our results give us insights into the strategic 
nature of land auctions, which should not be overlooked by policy makers.  
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Table 1: Case Study a 
 
 Site 1  Site 2  Site 3 
 
 3/2011 
Bedok Reservoir Road  
2/2012 
Bedok South Avenue 3  
7/2012 
Tanah Merah Kechil Road 
Rank 
 
Tenderer 
Price(S$) / 
GFA(sqm)  Tenderer 
Price(S$) / 
GFA(sqm)  Tenderer 
Price(S$) / 
GFA(sqm) 
1  United Venture Development Pte 
Ltd 
5010  FE Lakeside Pte Ltd 
FCL Topaz Pte Ltd 
Sekisui House Singapore Pte Ltd 
5750 
(18%)b 
 Fragrance Group Ltd  
World Class Land Pte Ltd  
7276 
 
2  FE Lakeside Pte Ltd  
FCL Topaz Pte Ltd 
Sekisui House Singapore Pte Ltd 
4885  United Venture Development Pte 
Ltd 
5665  
(13%) 
 Areca Investment Pte Ltd 
 
7146 
 
3  Best Desire Investments Ltd 4579  Kingsford Development Pte Ltd 5007  United Venture Development Pte 
Ltd 
6692 
(18%) 
4  First Changi Development Pte Ltd 4431  MCL Land Ltd 4771  Verwood Holdings Pte Ltd 
TID Residential Pte Ltd 
Intrepid Investments Pte Ltd 
6674 
 
5  Allgreen Properties Ltd 4008  Intrepid Investments Pte Ltd 
Hong Realty Ltd 
Sunmaster Holdings Pte Ltd 
4470  Sherwood Development Pte Ltd 6572 
 
6  Sunmaster Holdings Pte Ltd 3875  Mezzo Development Pte Ltd 4123   Sing Holdings Ltd 
Maxdin Pte Ltd 
6172 
7  Leng Hoe Development Pte Ltd 3366  Soilbuild Group Holdings Ltd 3910  Qingjian Realty Group Pte Ltd 6141 
8  Mezzo Development Pte Ltd 3147     Hock Lian Seng Holdings Ltd 
Meadows Bright 
Development Pte Ltd 
6128 
 
9        FE Lakeside Pte Ltd 
FCL Topaz Pte Ltd 
Sekisui House Singapore Pte Ltd 
5996  
(4%) 
10        Sunway Developments Pte Ltd 
Hoi Hup Realty Pte Ltd 
Hoi Hup Jv Development Pte Ltd 
5996 
11        Teneriffe Development Pte Ltd 5812 
12        Oue Reef Development Pte Ltd 5692 
13        Trident Assets Pte Ltd 5154 
a
 This table provides details of the bids submitted for auctions for three government land parcels sequentially launched at the Bedok Planning Area in Singapore.  Tenderer names highlighted in bold 
are two bidding entities that participated all three auction sales. 
b Numbers in brackets indicate the percent increase in Gross Floor Area adjusted bidding prices submitted by the same tenderer in the auction sequence. 
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Table 2a: Summary Statistics (by parcel) a  
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gross Floor Area (sqm) 248 45788.96 54399.49 138.6 588383 
Number of Bids 248 6.729839 3.967938 1 23 
Winning Bids 248 1.61E+08 1.31E+08 750000 6.83E+08 
Term being 60 Years instead of 99 Years 248 0.0040323 0.0635001 0 1 
Distance to Downtown (meters) 248 9511.404 4623.385 1448.07 18117.73 
Distance to the Closest MRT Station (meters) 248 960.0077 762.9375 38.66269 4306.37 
a
 Parcel-specific characteristics for all parcels launched by URA between 1990 and 2014 and that are developed into private condominiums. 
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Table 2b: Parcel Launches by Year  
Year # of private condo land parcel launches 
1990 5 
1991 2 
1992 2 
1993 7 
1994 9 
1995 14 
1996 38 
1997 28 
2000 15 
2001 7 
2002 4 
2003 2 
2005 1 
2006 3 
2007 10 
2008 10 
2009 4 
2010 23 
2011 25 
2012 23 
2013 11 
2014 5 
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Table 2c: Summary Statistics (by bid)  
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tenderer Bids 1848 1.74E+08 1.18E+08 738380 6.83E+08 
Gross Floor Area (square meters) 1848 49208.28 49013.78 138.6 588383 
60-Year Tenure Status 1848 0.0146104 0.1200197 0 1 
Distance to Downtown (meters) 1848 10019.94 4242.719 1448.07 18117.73 
Distance to the Closest MRT Station (meters) 1848 793.4029 722.1452 38.66269 4306.37 
Number of Bids 1848 9.19697 4.339311 1 23 
Joint Bid 1848 0.4393939 0.4964477 0 1 
Bidding Experience (Accumulated Gross Floor Area – 
square meters) 1848 128233 167814.7 0 807518.8 
Capacity Constraint (Accumulated Gross Floor Area in 
Past 2 Years – square meters) 1848 53066.47 76444.8 0 588383 
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Table 3: Hedonic Regressions  
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.8868 0.9678 0.7031 0.7969 
 
(15.10) (30.68) (13.22) (14.83) 
60-Year Tenure Status -0.8711 -1.2682 -0.7607 -1.0023 
 
(-9.34) (-15.84) (-5.83) (-10.52) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) -0.1044 -0.2868 -0.2548 -0.3439 
 
(-2.18) (-12.64) (-7.86) (-15.70) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0957 -0.0521 -0.0560 -0.0571 
 
(-5.94) (-5.20) (-3.62) (-4.86) 
Number of Bids 0.0642 0.0349 0.0302 0.0190 
 
(9.64) (8.53) (6.84) (3.83) 
Joint Bid 0.1491 0.0464 0.1990 0.0702 
 
(2.14) (2.34) (1.80) (3.04) 
Bidding Experience (Log Accumulated Gross Floor Area) 0.0233 0.0101 0.0830 0.0123 
 
(4.49) (3.73) (7.47) (3.14) 
Capacity Constraint (Log Accumulated Gross Floor Area in Past 2 Years) 0.0046 -0.0037 -0.0071 -0.0067 
 
(0.86) (-1.39) (-0.96) (-2.62) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 
R-squared 0.5688 0.8895 0.8137 0.9349 
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Table 4: Competitive Bidding  
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch within 2 year 0.7110 0.9572 0.7877 - - - 
 
(4.80) (7.50) (4.68) - - - 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch within half a year  - - - 0.5918 0.7922 0.6147 
 
- - - (6.53) (11.88) (6.18) 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch between half a year and 1 year - - - 0.4002 0.1346 0.4012 
  
- - - (4.02) (4.40) (3.16) 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch between 1 year and 2 years - - - 0.1068 0.1008 0.0633 
 
- - - (0.78) (1.85) (0.36) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.9520 0.7732 0.8352 0.9705 0.8176 0.8676 
 
(30.59) (20.60) (19.18) (34.19) (20.73) (21.40) 
60-Year Tenure Status -1.2462 -0.7178 -0.9907 -1.1876 -0.6943 -0.9486 
 
(-16.40) (-6.15) (-10.52) (-15.91) (-6.71) (-10.27) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) -0.2284 -0.2547 -0.2930 -0.2148 -0.3065 -0.2833 
 
(-7.66) (-8.20) (-11.38) (-7.17) (-12.26) (-10.76) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0568 -0.0561 -0.0585 -0.0700 -0.0636 -0.0723 
 
(-5.45) (-4.13) (-5.04) (-6.93) (-4.55) (-6.68) 
Number of Bids 0.0309 0.0286 0.0188 0.0299 0.0281 0.0187 
 (7.96) (6.88) (4.28) (7.93) (7.25) (4.41) 
Joint Bid 0.0485 0.1618 0.0643 0.0491 0.1521 0.0543 
 
(2.43) (1.67) (2.85) (2.68) (1.86) (2.39) 
Bidding Experience 0.0100 0.0725 0.0121 0.0110 0.0639 0.0152 
 
(3.91) (8.04) (3.34) (4.48) (8.25) (4.26) 
Capacity Constraint -0.0040 -0.0078 -0.0071 -0.0052 -0.0100 -0.0088 
 
(-1.58) (-1.16) (-3.42) (-2.17) (-1.72) (-4.28) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
R-squared 0.8974 0.8386 0.9414 0.9087 0.8576 0.9483 
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Table 5: Competitive Bidding – Robustness Check  
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch within 2 year 0.6669 0.5253 - - 
 
(5.77) (3.02) - - 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch within half a year  - - 0.7081 0.4647 
 
- - (6.09) (2.61) 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch between half a year and 1 year - - 0.4707 0.2526 
  
- - (4.05) (1.21) 
Previous launch within 4000 meters & 
Previous launch between 1 year and 2 years - - -0.1578 -0.1921 
  
- - (-1.08) (-0.55) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.8176 0.8477 0.8401 0.8477 
 
(18.51) (11.47) (20.44) (11.47) 
60-Year Tenure Status -1.0737 -1.5072 -1.0148 -1.5072 
 
(-8.47) (-7.55) (-8.18) (-7.55) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) 0.0502 0.1923 -0.0266 0.1923 
 
(0.62) (1.32) (-0.36) (1.32) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0380 0.0579 -0.0705 0.0579 
 
(-3.00) (1.77) (-5.50) (1.77) 
Number of Bids 0.0198 0.0201 0.0200 0.0201 
 
(4.07) (3.25) (4.01) (3.25) 
Joint Bid 0.0278 0.0186 0.0224 0.0186 
 
(1.47) (1.12) (1.21) (1.12) 
Bidding Experience 0.0130 0.0130 0.0147 0.0130 
 
(3.94) (4.86) (4.73) (4.86) 
Capacity Constraint -0.0072 -0.0066 -0.0082 -0.0066 
 
(-3.79) (-4.44) (-4.43) (-4.44) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Planning Area Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Planning Area × Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
R-squared 0.9540 0.9803 0.9593 0.9803 
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Table 6: Competitive Bidding – Isolated Sites 
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
No previous nearby launch within 2 years & 
No Subsequent nearby launch within 2 years  
– ISOLATED SITES -0.8715 -0.8411 -0.6908 
 
(-5.71) (-4.91) (-5.64) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.9766 0.8487 0.8326 
 
(38.27) (21.20) (18.71) 
60-Year Tenure Status -1.2461 -0.9926 -1.0981 
 
(-16.48) (-10.49) (-8.75) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) -0.2164 -0.2917 0.0705 
 
(-7.08) (-11.22) (0.85) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0538 -0.0572 -0.0373 
 
(-5.29) (-4.93) (-2.96) 
Number of Bids 0.0322 0.0196 0.0208  
 
(9.03) (4.50) (4.35) 
Joint Bid 0.0489 0.0637 0.0285 
 
(2.47) (2.85) (1.50) 
Bidding Experience 0.0100 0.0120 0.0129 
 
(3.97) (3.34) (3.90) 
Capacity Constraint -0.0041 -0.0071 -0.0072 
 
(-1.68) (-3.49) (-3.81) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Planning Area Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
Observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 
R-squared 0.9006 0.9421 0.9540 
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Table 7: Probability of Participating in and Winning the Immediate Subsequent Land Auction  
 (t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variables Participate Participate Participate Win Win Win 
 Incumbent Winner 1 -0.1432 -0.1666 -0.0169 -0.0217 -0.0212 -0.0001 
 
(-4.87) (-5.57) (-0.51) (-4.82) (-4.61) (-0.01) 
Subsequent Site launched within 4 km 0.0217 0.0252 0.0441 0.0268 0.0247 0.0271 
 
(0.81) (0.94) (1.57) (1.55) (1.71) (1.90) 
Incumbent Winner × Subsequent Site 
launched within 4 km 0.1027 0.0832 0.0467 -0.0123 -0.0125 -0.0180 
 
(3.30) (3.22) (1.91) (-0.72) (-0.76) (-1.13) 
Bidding Experience YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Capacity Constraint YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Previously Launched Parcel Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Subsequently Launched Parcel Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Observations 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079 
R-squared 0.0626 0.2059 0.3486 0.0146 0.0884 0.1262 
1 The bidding behavior of the previous winner is compared with that of the second highest bidder of the same auction.  The difference of the tendering prices between the winner 
and the second highest bidder is restricted to be within 5% of the winning bid. 
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Table 8: Probability of Participating in and Winning the Immediate Subsequent Land Auction  – Placebo Test 
 (t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variables Participate Participate Participate Win Win Win 
 Pseudo Incumbent Winner 0.0440 0.0268 -0.0157 -0.0047 -0.0060 -0.0390 
 (1.76) (1.47) (-0.62) (-0.83) (-0.98) (-3.70) 
Subsequent Site launched within 4 km 0.0350 0.0211 0.0295 0.0054 -0.0010 0.0010 
 (1.83) (1.31) (1.90) (0.57) (-0.09) (0.09) 
Pseudo Incumbent Winner × Subsequent Site 
launched within 4 km -0.0049 0.0003 -0.0146 0.0169 0.0170 0.0134 
 (-0.14) (0.01) (-0.51) (1.08) (1.04) (0.81) 
Bidding Experience YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Capacity Constraint YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Previously Launched Parcel Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Subsequently Launched Parcel Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Observations 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 
R-squared 0.0010 0.2171 0.3704 0.0013 0.1167 0.1420 
1 The pseudo incumbent winner refers to the second highest bidder of the previous auction. As a placebo test, the bidding behavior of the second highest bidder is compared with 
that of the third highest bidder of the same auction.  The difference of the tendering prices between the second and the third highest bidder is restricted to be within 5% of the 
winning bid. 
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Figure 1: Three Sequential GLS in Bedok Urban Planning Area 
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Site 3 
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Figure 2: Expected profits given winning bid  
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Figure 3: # of developers versus # of auctions participated 
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Figure 4: Three Dimensional Effects by Time and Space 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Competitive Bidding – Robustness Check  
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous launch within 3500 meters & 
Previous launch within 2 year 0.3401 0.7849 0.3380 - - - 
 
(3.60) (6.04) (4.11) - - - 
Previous launch within 3500 meters & 
Previous launch within half a year  - - - 0.4814 0.6948 0.5302 
 
- - - (5.89) (9.85) (5.81) 
Previous launch within 3500 meters & 
Previous launch between half a year and 1 year - - - 0.3032 0.1079 0.2612 
 
- - - (4.04) (2.95) (2.82) 
Previous launch within 3500 meters & 
Previous launch between 1 year and 2 years - - - -0.1291 0.0699 -0.2448 
 
- - - (-1.31) (1.38) (-1.99) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.9563 0.7342 0.8040 0.9549 0.7667 0.8098 
 
(29.54) (15.62) (15.10) (29.70) (14.97) (14.51) 
60-Year Tenure Status -1.2561 -0.7408 -0.9958 -1.2164 -0.7247 -0.9648 
 
(-16.12) (-6.12) (-10.54) (-15.70) (-6.59) (-10.46) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) -0.2598 -0.2566 -0.3236 -0.2450 -0.3009 -0.3131 
 
(-10.34) (-8.30) (-14.70) (-9.47) (-11.52) (-13.85) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0570 -0.0603 -0.0601 -0.0677 -0.0634 -0.0709 
 
(-5.31) (-4.12) (-5.00) (-6.66) (-4.39) (-6.35) 
Number of Bids 0.0329 0.0289 0.0185 0.0312 0.0280 0.0170 
 
(8.31) (6.84) (3.83) (7.69) (7.00) (3.43) 
Joint Bid 0.0479 0.1754 0.0678 0.0497 0.1652 0.0621 
 
(2.41) (1.74) (2.89) (2.65) (1.87) (2.53) 
Bidding Experience 0.0101 0.0750 0.0123 0.0112 0.0676 0.0149 
 
(3.79) (7.79) (3.20) (4.26) (7.80) (3.85) 
Capacity Constraint -0.0039 -0.0088 -0.0070 -0.0050 -0.0109 -0.0084 
 
(-1.51) (-1.25) (-3.06) (-1.99) (-1.75) (-3.78) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
R-squared 0.8888 0.8269 0.9345 0.8948 0.8439 0.9385 
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Table A2: Competitive Bidding – Robustness Check  
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous launch within 4500 meters & 
Previous launch within 2 year 0.6626 0.8714 0.7067 - - - 
 
(4.56) (7.16) (4.28) - - - 
Previous launch within 4500 meters & 
Previous launch within half a year  - - - 0.5761 0.7550 0.5953 
 
- - - (6.56) (12.20) (6.28) 
Previous launch within 4500 meters & 
Previous launch between half a year and 1 year - - - 0.3848 0.1308 0.3746 
 
- - - (4.10) (4.37) (3.18) 
Previous launch within 4500 meters & 
Previous launch between 1 year and 2 years - - - 0.0653 0.0819 0.0033 
 
- - - (0.50) (1.45) (0.02) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.9495 0.7639 0.8241 0.9645 0.8089 0.8508 
 
(30.07) (19.45) (18.52) (33.19) (19.79) (20.07) 
60-Year Tenure Status -1.2257 -0.7063 -0.9639 -1.1568 -0.6806 -0.9122 
 
(-16.37) (-5.99) (-10.29) (-15.79) (-6.47) (-10.04) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) -0.2224 -0.2474 -0.2848 -0.2048 -0.2962 -0.2713 
 
(-7.11) (-7.96) (-10.45) (-6.50) (-11.82) (-9.63) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0632 -0.0610 -0.0658 -0.0797 -0.0691 -0.0819 
 
(-5.52) (-4.09) (-5.19) (-6.96) (-4.44) (-6.58) 
Number of Bids 0.0301 0.0278 0.0173 0.0284 0.0273 0.0166 
 
(7.80) (6.58) (3.82) (7.64) (6.92) (3.76) 
Joint Bid 0.0465 0.1639 0.0649 0.0460 0.1531 0.0557 
 
(2.34) (1.62) (2.87) (2.52) (1.76) (2.45) 
Bidding Experience 0.0097 0.0727 0.0119 0.0105 0.0644 0.0148 
 
(3.81) (8.06) (3.17) (4.32) (8.32) (3.98) 
Capacity Constraint -0.0034 -0.0071 -0.0067 -0.0043 -0.0092 -0.0081 
 
(-1.35) (-1.07) (-3.15) (-1.78) (-1.62) (-3.98) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
R-squared 0.8962 0.8358 0.9401 0.9067 0.8546 0.9463 
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Table A3: Competitive Bidding – Robustness Check 
Dependent Variable: Log Tenderer Bid 
(t statistics are reported in parenthesis using clustered standard errors at the tenderer level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous launch within 2 years & 
Previous launch within 12000 meters 0.2779 0.4180 0.2196 - - - 
 
(4.70) (5.04) (3.09) - - - 
Previous launch within 2 years & 
Previous launch within 4000 meters - - - 0.1925 0.2571 0.1270 
 
- - - (4.20) (5.98) (3.49) 
Previous launch within 2 years & Previous 
launch between 4000 meters and 8000 meters - - - 0.1222 0.1932 0.1129 
 
- - - (2.69) (4.19) (2.21) 
Previous launch within 2 years & Previous 
launch between 8000 meters and 12000 meters - - - 0.0118 -0.0398 0.0389 
  
- - - (0.21) (-0.64) (0.55) 
Log (Gross Floor Area) 0.9602 0.6956 0.7914 0.9729 0.7280 0.8084 
 
(30.19) (12.68) (14.60) (32.15) (14.91) (15.96) 
60-Year Tenure Status -1.2795 -0.7817 -1.0121 -1.2456 -0.7621 -0.9916 
 
(-15.71) (-6.13) (-10.56) (-15.82) (-6.08) (-10.26) 
Log (Distance to Downtown) -0.2707 -0.2385 -0.3335 -0.2596 -0.2243 -0.3244 
 
(-11.50) (-7.48) (-15.09) (-9.58) (-6.81) (-13.73) 
Log (Distance to the Closest MRT Station) -0.0533 -0.0561 -0.0579 -0.0552 -0.0628 -0.0609 
 
(-5.30) (-3.72) (-4.95) (-5.24) (-3.92) (-4.90) 
Number of Bids 0.0346 0.0296 0.0189 0.0333 0.0286 0.0189 
 
(8.45) (6.84) (3.81) (8.61) (6.54) (3.86) 
Joint Bid 0.0486 0.1959 0.0689 0.0487 0.1913 0.0686 
 
(2.47) (1.87) (2.96) (2.45) (1.96) (2.92) 
Bidding Experience 0.0099 0.0719 0.0117 0.0097 0.0683 0.0113 
 
(3.68) (7.39) (3.07) (3.66) (7.34) (2.94) 
Capacity Constraint -0.0038 -0.0078 -0.0069 -0.0037 -0.0076 -0.0071 
 
(-1.46) (-1.09) (-2.78) (-1.43) (-1.11) (-2.86) 
Quarter × Year Fixed Effects YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Tenderer Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
R-squared 0.8879 0.8202 0.9338 0.8903 0.8250 0.9347 
 
